Public Safety

Help with a policy memo on Public Safety

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Policy
Memo
Definition of Genre
Policy memos are not like other academic papers. Their main purpose is to provide analysis and/or
recommendations regarding a certain issue, and they are written for a specific, often limited, audience. Because of
the need for quick, accurate information in the policy world, policy memos are written so that readers can
efficiently access fact-based information in order to make an informed decision. Memos should, therefore, try to
inform the audience in a concise, organized, and professional manner, while still including the most relevant
content.
Writing criteria for policy memos
An effective memo will do its job if the reader comprehends the main points after one quick read or even after
reading just the first sentence of each section. To ensure that the memo gets the intended results, pay close
attention to the following: (1) content, (2) structure, (3) organization, (4) word choice, and (5) clarity.
Content
Content, of course, is the most important determinant of a good policy memo. Weak or illogical ideas, no matter
how well-presented, do no one any good. Therefore, a memo should provide both accurate and relevant
information, while also acknowledging the limitations of certain recommendations or analysis. Any
recommendations should include honest and realistic alternatives. Here are some things to keep in mind:
 Present the most relevant information and state your main ideas and any recommendations clearly.
 Make sure to present opinions as opinions and NOT as facts. Opinions presented should also be
substantiated.
 Use logic and facts to support each of your main points and/or to refute opposing points. When citing
facts in-text, be accurate.
 Avoid logical fallacies such as appeals to authority, slippery slope arguments, hasty generalizations, and
faulty causation.
Structure
1. Header
Structure, simply put, means how a memo looks. Most memos take the general form of an email, and the first
page has “To:,” “From:,” “Date;” and a title that starts with “RE:.” Consider the following example (with bolding
used to identify the parts):
To: Timothy Geithner, Secretary of Treasury (Writer’s Audience)
From: Michelle (Min Eun) Jeon, Policy Advisor (Writer’s name and title)
Date: 2/20/2012 (Date)
RE: Overcoming the Obstacle: House Speaker John Boehner (Title/Main Idea)
The header as formatted above comes at the beginning of a memo. With the header, the reader will know to whom
the writer is writing, what authority the writer has to address the audience, and the most critical message of the
memo.
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2. Executive Summary
Below the header, a memo generally includes an executive summary, a single paragraph that summarizes the
entire memo. After reading the memo just once, the reader can understand what the rest of the memo will explain.
The executive summary can stand alone and allow the reader to look at the first paragraph and identify the main
points of the rest of the memo.
Sample of an executive summary:
Secretary Geithner’s China currency bill depends on House Speaker John Boehner’s support since the Speaker chooses
which bill to debate in the House of Representatives. Mr. Boehner will only debate the bill after pressure from his
financial supporters, security and investment corporations and their lobbyists; and his electoral constituents, Ohio State
citizens and the Republican Party.
A few things become obvious after reading this example. First of all, the audience, Secretary Geithner, will
understand that he will get a certain bill passed only through pressuring House Speaker John Boehner. Also,
Secretary Geithner will be able to predict that the rest of the memo will elaborate on Mr. Boehner’s “financial
supporters, security and investment corporations and their lobbyists; and his electoral constituents, the Ohio State
citizens and the Republican party,” the people who will have the most influence on Mr. Boehner. We can assume
that the writer will provide statistics on why such groups hold the most power over Mr. Boehner’s decision
making process as well as a logical recommendation on how to get these groups to pressure Mr. Boehner. If the
reader finds the main point to be very direct and clear in an executive summary, then the writer will have done
his or her job well.
3. Subheading
The rest of the paper will have several sections elaborating on the points indicated in the executive summary.
Those sections will start with a subheading, usually in bold-font to make the title eye-catching for the reader. A
subheading should generally be a summary of the section, so the reader will not necessarily have to read the
rest of the section to understand the most important information the section contains.
Example: Speaker Boehner: Greatest challenge for the currency bill
Example: Mr. Boehner’s pro-business interests
Organization
Memo writers should employ a common skill in journalism, called the “inverted pyramid style of writing.” This
means memos should place the most important information at the top and have the less significant details
follow in order or importance.
In an academic paper, you would mix up the order, usually having the most important point come last. But in a
memo, the most important fact should always come first. To visualize, this is what it would generally look like:
Academic Paper Memorandum
2 1 (most important)
3 (least important) 2
1 (most important) 3 (least important)
Such prioritization should always occur in every section of the memo, from the general large structure to small
sub-sections.
Word Choice
Word choice plays a critical role in making a memo clear and concise. Consider eliminating vague theoretical
words and replacing them with more concrete, specific terms. Here are a few examples:
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Vague More Concrete
facilitate help/assist
indicate say/show
concept idea
Clarity
Policy memos must be clear and direct so that readers can understand the main points quickly. If the memo writer
has focused on building strong content that is well organized, and if the writing exhibits well-chosen language,
then the result is a clear argument.
One way to understand the type of clarity that is required in a policy memo is to compare a memo to a typical
history paper. While academic papers focus more on gradually building a solid argument, a memo delivers the
important facts in order of priority as concisely as possible. Let’s consider the introduction of a history paper as
an example.
A True Friendship?:
James and the Nature of the Toussaint-Laveaux Relationship
In his groundbreaking book, The Black Jacobins (1963), C.L.R. James traces the history of the Haitian Revolution
by analyzing the events as they occurred in light of happenings in France, particularly the French Revolution,
abolition, and the rise of Napoleon. To accomplish this task, James focuses much attention on the biography of
Toussaint L’Ouverture and his relationship with the French government as represented by various white and mulatto
leaders. As the reader follows Toussaint’s life story, she learns that Toussaint trusted only one man in all his life:
Governor-General Etienne Laveaux (James 161). Laveaux was a French nobleman under the old regime, and his life
trajectory differed drastically from that of Toussaint. Based on a critical reading of Toussaint’s letters to Laveaux,
this brief essay explores the nature of the two leaders’ relationship and the problem that James’s interpretation of
their friendship poses.
In this example, the author builds her argument by first presenting the topic and then providing background detail.
She then ends her introduction with a sentence that explains what the essay will address. While this type of
introduction would work for a history paper, it would not work well for a memo because it lacks a central claim
and provides too much detail in the beginning. Instead, memos should lead with central claims in order to ensure
clarity. Let’s consider another example of a memo executive summary:
Demands for a Solid Economic Policy Towards China
The demand for a policy to resolve the undervalued Chinese Yuan (renminbi) is increasing since the US public
attributes the US’ economic problems to the depreciation of the Chinese currency. The President and his new trade
unit’s immediate focus should be to get China to appreciate its artificially undervalued Yuan. Correcting the value of
the Yuan will ultimately increase both on-shore jobs and US exports.
In this example, the author gets right to the point. The context she provides is limited to the first sentence. She
also presents a recommendation in the second sentence. The reader will expect that the author will provide further
context and statistics to support this recommendation in other sections of the memo.
Other Points to Clarify
Because professors and Teaching Assistants (TAs) teaching public policy might have different expectations,
clarify the following with each potential grader:
1. Should the titles of sections be in full sentences?
2. Should the paragraphs and sections be divided into several parts or is only a handful better?
3. Do I have to include an executive summary?
4. Is the usage of words such as “But” or “Because” or “However” discouraged?
5. Should I not write any lengthy sentences?
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* Make sure you read the prompt carefully! The prompt will have a lot of the answers to the questions above,
since the prompt will reflect the grading criteria. Bringing the prompt with you to the Writing Studio when you
have an appointment will also help the tutors understand how to help you.
Good luck on memo writing!

1
POLICY MEMORANDUM SAMPLES

2
I. Introduction
The following policy memorandum samples provide you with examples on the format of a policy
memorandum. They display a variety and approaches and styles that you may find helpful when
developing your own policy memorandum.
Please note that these examples do not necessarily correspond to the writing guidelines and
evaluation criteria specifically established for the Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge
(e.g. some memos do not provide sources). The samples are therefore by no means a template for
your memo.
Please carefully follow the memo writing instructions provided separately to ensure that your
submission meets the requirements established for the Global Debate and Public Policy
Challenge.
II. List of sample policy memos
1. Harvard Kennedy School of Government (no date). Re-organizing the Government to Combat the
WMD Threat. Retrieved from
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/degreeprograms/registrar/sample-policy-memo.pdf
2. LK11538 (2012). Digital Freedoms and Canadian Economic Policy. Submission to the Global Debate
and Public Policy Challenge 2012-2013.
3. KG10240 (2012). Sanctions of the 21st century. Submission to the Global Debate and Public Policy
Challenge 2012-2013.
MEMORANDUM
TO: President of the United States
FROM: [ ]
SUBJECT: Re-organizing the Government to Combat the WMD Threat
DATE: xx / xx / xxxx
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is the most serious threat to U.S.
security today, and will remain so far into the future. Whereas combating proliferation is an
inherently government-wide mission, the existing national security architecture has resulted in
a series of agency-specific efforts that are often poorly coordinated and fail to take advantage of
important synergies. Re-organizing the government to meet the WMD threat therefore requires
reforms that strengthen White House management of nonproliferation programs, expand
interagency counterproliferation capabilities, and improve WMD-related intelligence.
Strengthen White House Management of Nonproliferation Programs
The Departments of Energy (DOE), State, Defense (DOD), Commerce, and Homeland Security
(DHS) all contribute to U.S. nonproliferation efforts, but receive insufficient top-level program
guidance and coordination. For example, DOE did not learn of Libya’s decision to abandon its
nuclear program until it was revealed in the press. Moreover, DOE had no plan in place to
dismantle Libya’s nuclear assets despite its central role in performing such activities. Finally,
proliferation detection R&D projects are currently managed by a community of end users that
have overlapping needs but rarely communicate with each other.
To prevent future interagency breakdowns, the White House should designate a new seniorlevel Nonproliferation Policy and Program Director (NPD) to oversee all U.S. government
nonproliferation programs. The NPD will chair a new National Security Council Policy
Coordinating Committee on Nonproliferation (PCC) that will set overarching nonproliferation
goals and priorities, develop an interagency strategic plan to achieve those goals and priorities,
identify and assign missions and responsibilities to appropriate agencies, and coordinate
program execution. To improve proliferation detection R&D, the NPD and PCC will also
design an interagency technology development plan that will integrate and prioritize the needs
of various technology end users across the government with the capabilities of the U.S. national
laboratory system, private industry, and top universities. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) will work with the new NPD and PCC to develop a multi-year interagency
nonproliferation program budget, and will apply performance measures to monitor program
management and implementation.
Although the NPD and the PCC will require little additional funding, past attempts at White
House policy coordination – such as the Office of Homeland Security – have sunk into
irrelevance because of agency resistance. To avoid suffering a similar fate, the NPD and PCC
must possess clearly delineated authority and high level backing. In particular, the NPD should
enjoy unambiguous control over nonproliferation policy and program budgets. The PCC
should require agency participation at the Under Secretary level. Most important, the NPD and
PCC must receive consistent, visible support from the President.
Expand Interagency Counterproliferation Capabilities
The U.S. military and homeland security communities must be able to rapidly respond to
proliferation emergencies. To provide this capability, the United States should create and train
“Proliferation Risk Mitigation Teams” – akin to the Department of Homeland Security’s
Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) – comprised of DOD special operations forces (SOF),
CIA operatives, and DOE technical specialists. These teams will be capable of securing nuclear
storage facilities and other sensitive infrastructure during combat operations or in response to
the collapse of central authority in states that possess nuclear assets that are attractive to
terrorists. They will also provide logistical and operational support to the Energy Department’s
“Global Cleanout” program that seeks to return stockpiles of weapons-usable highly enriched
uranium to Russia and the United States. Finally, they will engage in extensive “red-teaming”
simulations in order to foster better situation awareness and preparedness.
Operational control of Proliferation Risk Mitigation Teams will pose a major challenge.
Congress may object to placing the teams under CIA control in light of the agency’s past abuses.
Moreover, DOD will be reluctant to assign SOF personnel to the teams if they will be placed
under the command authority of a different agency. Given the types of operations in which the
teams are likely to engage, DOD operational control would therefore seem most appropriate.
The teams will cost approximately $500 million annually to train and equip. To provide the
necessary funding, the United States should cancel the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser
program, which has been plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays.
Improve WMD Intelligence
The effectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts ultimately depends
on the quality of WMD intelligence. Unfortunately, the U.S. intelligence community has a poor
track record of detecting both state-level and sub-state WMD proliferation. It failed to
anticipate India’s nuclear test in 1998, produced flawed assessments of the threat from Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq, and only belatedly uncovered the nuclear black market smuggling ring of
Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. In addition, the intelligence community remains unable to
provide reliable information on the status of nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.
To improve community-wide WMD intelligence collection and analysis, the United States
should, per the recommendation of the recent WMD commission, create a new National
Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). The Center would report directly to the new Director for
National Intelligence and set requirements for WMD-related human, imagery, and signals
collection for the entire intelligence community. It would also house an analytical division that
would provide high-quality, actionable intelligence assessments to customers across the U.S.
government, including the new White House NPD.
The NCPC will require approximately $1 billion in annual funding. Given this price tag,
Congress may resist creation of the NCPC until it can determine whether recent legislation will
effectively address current intelligence community deficiencies. Moreover, CIA already
operates an analytical unit devoted to WMD intelligence (WINPAC) that will fiercely resist
encroachment upon its turf. The NCPC should therefore function as both a consumer and
independent reviewer of WINPAC intelligence products while avoiding disruptive turf battles.
Competition between WINPAC and the NCPC could result in higher-quality intelligence
products from both.
LK11538 Page 1
POLICY MEMO
TO: The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada
FROM: Mr. Malcolm Peck-McQueen
DATE: November 30, 2012
RE: Digital Freedoms and Canadian Economic Policy
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has obtained reliable intelligence confirming
that the Canadian-based company, Saur-N, has entered into a contract to provide
communications technology to China’s authoritarian government. This technology will allow
Chinese officials to track mobile telephone signals, break into email and social networking
accounts, censor web searches, and block internet access and mobile phone signals. The Chinese
regime is already notorious for such limitations on digital freedoms. Government departments
regularly censor websites, monitor private emails, and regulate content of websites such as
Google and Yahoo! (Human Rights Watch, 2006). However, while Saur-N’s technology will
further enable Chinese officials to monitor private communications and restrict freedom of
expression via the internet, it will also improve the efficiency of China’s private sector
businesses and thereby develop the Chinese economy.
Historically, Canada has maintained a neutral relationship with China as there has been
no history of Sino-Canadian conflict or competition. Canada’s current, formal relationship with
China allows bilateral access to each state’s technological development activities if such access
is for peaceful purposes (Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, 2008).
Canada is also a signatory member of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which declares
that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers” (1948).
Tacit approval of the contract is the simplest policy available to the Government of
Canada. It is said that the increased efficiency in Chinese private sector businesses will spur
economic growth and reduce poverty (Wilson and Wilson, 2006). In turn, economic growth will
shift Chinese values towards support for freedoms of expression and democracy (Inglehart and
Welzel, 2009). This policy assumes that freedoms of expression inevitably result from economic
LK11538
LK11538 Page 2
development. However, permitting the Saur-N contract would signal to the international
community that Canada values economic growth over digital freedoms and human rights.
A second policy option limits the use of communications technology to private sector,
Chinese businesses and, upon breach of this condition, allows Canada to block future sales.
However, the international community will likely view this unfavourably as Canada should,
based on public reports (Human Rights Watch, 2012), expect Chinese officials to inevitably
utilize the technology to violate digital freedoms. Canada will then be forced to damage relations
with the Chinese government by blocking future sales and economic development.
In reality, there is a policy option that allows Canada to maintain a favourable
international reputation and strengthen relations with China. The Government of Canada must
completely block the sale of Saur-N’s technology. This policy will signal that Canada does not
tolerate violations of basic digital rights by authoritarian regimes and that Canada will take a
leading role in promoting freedoms of digital expression and online privacy rights. Canada must
also promote economic cooperation through other means which will enhance relations with
Chinese citizens.
Specifically, this policy requires the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade to issue private directives to Saur-N and make public statements requesting nullification of
the sales contract. Secondly, the Canada Border Services Agency must implement a strict
embargo on Saur-N’s technology in the event that the company attempts to export its product
despite discouragement from the government. Finally, Canada must establish the Canada-China
Digital Entrepreneurship Consortium (CCDEC) as an initiative to promote economic
development through private sector, digital businesses. After its creation, the Government of
Canada should invest $20 million annually in the CCDEC for training conferences and seminars
on the relationship between digital technology and business.
Firstly, public and private statements denouncing the sales contract send a strong
message that the Government of Canada will not condone authoritarian practices by foreign
regimes. A recent report indicates that Canadian multinational mining corporations have
successfully implemented 18 of 27 recommendations of Canada’s Corporate Social
Responsibility Strategy including provision of tools to support human rights in local civil
societies (Mining Association of Canada, 2012). In this instance, strong government action
effectively pressured companies to develop international human rights through corporate
practices. Therefore, public government statements promoting corporate social responsibility for
digital rights are likely to convince Saur-N and other companies to refrain from business
practices that assist Chinese officials in surveillance.
By also implementing an embargo on Saur-N’s technology, Canada will demonstrate
determination to prevent digital rights abuses. Historical evidence from the oil embargo of 1973
indicates that embargoes severely restrict an importing country’s capability to execute policy.
Arab oil exporting countries, seeking to punish the USA for supporting Israel in war, banned oil
exports to Western countries, caused reductions of oil supply which varied from 7% to 35%, and
LK11538 Page 3
limited countries’ ability to provide oil to citizens (Davis, 1976). If strictly applied, Canada’s
similar embargo will proactively restrict the Chinese regime’s ability to further spy on private
communications. Undertaking this leadership role will strengthen Canada’s reputation
internationally as a promoter of the rights declared in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Lastly, the creation of and investment in the Canada-China Digital Entrepreneurship
Consortium will achieve Canadian, Chinese and international objectives by developing digital
freedoms while stimulating international economic growth. The CCDEC shows potential based
on evidence from the Digital Freedom Initiative (DFI) launched in 2003 by the USA. The DFI
was a public-private initiative that successfully achieved similar objectives. Partnerships were
created between the USA and Senegal to train Senegalese citizens how to use email and the
Internet to research and create international economic relationships through The Cyber Luoma
marketplace (United States Agency for International Development, 2005). This success indicates
that the CCDEC can expand digital freedoms by allowing Chinese citizens to access unrestricted
digital content through Canadian-sponsored training seminars. The Chinese can then apply their
digital training, as the Senegalese did, to international entrepreneurial activities that stimulate
international trade and economic growth.

The policy suggested here is superior to the alternatives because it advances digital
freedoms as its primary objective while allowing for subsequent economic growth. Therefore, it
will satisfy most stakeholders. It will achieve international support as it affirms international
treaty obligations, domestic support as it strengthens Canada’s economy, and support from
Chinese citizens as it provides them with basic digital freedoms.
Saur-N is willing to fulfill their contractual obligations to the Chinese. Should it obtain
the company’s communications technology, the Chinese regime’s capabilities to monitor private
communications between citizens will be greatly expanded and digital freedoms will be
egregiously violated. While the technology will improve the efficiency of Chinese businesses,
Canada cannot support policies that condone unethical business practices and policies that place
economic growth before the promotion of digital freedom. It is recommended that the
Government of Canada block the business deal outright. This will require public and private
condemnation of the contract along with a strict embargo of Saur-N’s technology. It is critical
that the government simultaneously develop the Canada-China Digital Entrepreneurship
Consortium to strengthen economic ties. By implementing the policy suggested here, the
Government of Canada will not only satisfy Chinese and Canadian citizens but also uphold
international treaty obligations by promoting global digital freedoms.
LK11538 Page 4
Works Cited
Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the Government of Canada
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Canada-People’s Republic of
China, 17 July 2008, Canada Treaty Series 2008 No 6. Retrieved October 21, 2012, from
http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105085
Davis, Jerome. (1976). The Arab Use of Oil: October 1973-July 1974. Cooperation and Conflict,
11(1), 57-67.
Human Rights Watch. (2006). Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet
Censorship (Human Rights Watch Report Volume 18, No. 8(C)). Human Rights Watch.
Retrieved October 21, 2012, from www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
china0806webwcover.pdf
Human Rights Watch. (2012). World Report 2012. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press.
Retrieved November 7, 2012, from www.hrw.org
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. (2009). How Development Leads to Democracy: What
We Know About Modernization. Foreign Affairs, 88(2). Retrieved November 5, 2012,
from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
Mining Association of Canada. (2012). Recommendations of the National Roundtables on
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Extractive Industry in Developing Countries:
Current Actions, Stakeholder Opinions and Emerging Issues. Ottawa, ON: Mining
Association of Canada. Retrieved November 7, 2012, from http://www.mining.ca/site/
index.php/en/news-a-media/publications.html
LK11538 Page 5
UN General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Resolution 217 A (III).
Retrieved November 7, 2012, from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/
rwmain?docid=3ae6b3712c&page=search
United States Agency for International Development. (2005). The Digital Freedom Initiative
Annual Report: March 2004-March 2005. Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for
International Development. Retrieved November 8 2012, from https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/
home/Default.aspx
Wilson, Craig, and Peter Wilson. (2006). Make Poverty Business: Increase Profits and Reduce
Risks by Engaging with the Poor. Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Publishing Limited.
MEMORANDUM
Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge | KG10240 1
SANCTIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY
From: KG10240
To: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.
Re: SCENARIO D
Date: NOVEMBER 30, 2012
1. INTRODUCTION
In October 2011 the Wall Street Journal published an article describing how the oppressive Syrian
government bought censorship systems of US-based company Blue Coat Systems Inc. (2011) We
now face another company, Saur-N, trying to sell its surveillance mechanisms to a well-known
authoritative regime (henceforth referred to as “WKAR”).
The problem of reselling censorship systems affects everyone: both liberal and illiberal governments,
people thereof and international organizations – in the Arab Spring we saw them all get involved. (See
Figure 1.1) Since declaration on the Internet can now lead to serious harm or possibly death of many,
as it has in the case of Abdul Ghani Al Khanjar, this is an issue of utmost importance. (Silver & Elgin,
2011)
Figure 1.1 Structure of relationships
2. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Impact of internet censorship is hard to estimate, but an analogy with the defense industry seems to be
appropriate, as one Member of the European Parliament said: “We have to acknowledge that certain
software products now are actually as effective as weapons.“ (RWB, 2012, p. 1) Size-wise, US arms
exports industry, amounted to $85.3 billion in 2011, while the whole project of China’s censorship
cost $800 million until 2002—which we can use a rough guide to the size of the censorship
industry—making it clear that censorship is economically less important than the arms industry.
(Shanker, 2012) (Yang, 2003) The relatively smaller, equally important, censorship industry
MEMORANDUM
Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge | KG10240 2
should be regulated in some fashion, as the bigger already is – in 2007 alone, the US government
investigated 37 defense deals, many including expensive equipment like jet-fighters. (Department of
Justice, 2007)
However, there is a number of European companies—e.g. French Télécom—that export censorship
technology to Asia and Africa and thus we must weight possible disadvantage to the American
industry & Saur-N, if we block this sale. (Wagner, 2012)
Any policy should ideally:
• Limit trade as little as possible
• Do as little damage to mutual relations
• Protect Human Rights like the right to assembly and freedom of speech
US foreign policy stresses human rights and jus cogens—norms that are legally binding and cannot be
changed by treaties—as embodied by many documents, inter alia the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. (Department of State, 2012) (Trindade, 2008) We do not have any legally binding
obligation to prevent the sale of “dual use” products—products that can be used for both civilian and
military/oppressive purposes. (Brown & Korff, 2012) Nevertheless, letting the trade go through
without any restrictions is too great of a risk to human rights, to our binding obligations to
them, image of the United States and the current administration. So far, this problem has been
rather peripheral, due to low public awareness; however issues pertaining to surveillance can irritate
the public, as reaction to ACTA testifies. (Arthur, 2012)
Some transactions are done via intermediaries, which is the only reason why the Blue Coat sale to
Syria was not a direct violation of the 2004 US export ban. (Carbone, 2012) Thus we need policy to
allow us to prevent such trade. For instance, the aforementioned Blue Coat sale to Syria, had a
proportion going to Burma, which was legal even though, at that time, there were many other trade
restrictions placed on Burma. (Department of State, 2012) (Carbone, 2012) The sale to Syria was
illegal, just because this specific ban is defined negatively, by listing trade articles which are nonrestricted—food and medicine. (US Embassy, 2012) To be effective, any proposal must therefore
cover possible re-sale of censorship systems via intermediaries to states more oppressive than
WKAR.
3. POLICY OPTIONS
BLOCK
+ No possibility of loopholes – Worsened bilateral relations
+ Positive image of US – selfless act – Significantly harms Saur-N and the whole US
industry
+ Simple future regulation – Saur-N might simply be replaced by a
competitor company
+ Quick implementation – Does not set up future guidelines
This policy is bold and is not yet matched by Europe, which only passed a non-binding resolution on
April 18, 2012 against any oppressive regime trying to purchase censorship systems. (Brown & Korff,
2012) The impact on bilateral relations is hard to estimate, as we cannot know how important this
trade is for WKAR. Allegedly, WKAR will be able to conduct its business more efficiently; however,
given the nature of the regime and what other countries have done with censorship systems, there are
some serious reasons to doubt this. (Wagner, 2012) (OpenNet Initative, 2012) US already restricted
MEMORANDUM
Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge | KG10240 3
software manufacturers’ exports in the past and this sale could potentially enable much more
significant abuses. (Ogonowski, 1997)
ALLOW TRADE WITH RESTRICTIONS
+ The trade can still go through – Need to deal with intermediaries
+ If we justify the restrictions well, bilateral
relations will be preserved
– Can still worsen bilateral relationships, if not
justified properly
+ Might establish a sustainable long-term policy – Some harm to US industry
+ If the deal still goes through, there is no harm
to Saur-N and will not be replaced by a European
or Chinese competitor. (Rohde, 2011)
– Negative image of US – we allow censorship
(some people might misconstrue this as even
supporting censorship abroad)
There is a variety of possible restrictions; (Chiang, 2010) however the following seem to be most
beneficial:
(1) Companies exporting censorship systems should be obligated to integrate remote kill
mechanisms that would allow these companies, if asked by a relevant body, to cease all the
systems’ censoring
(2) There should be limits on the level of sophistication of censorship systems, as was common
with ICT in the past with for instance Content Scrambling System (Seltzer, 2000)
(3) Facilitate information pooling between censorship vendors as to assess the demander’s
credibility as a final buyer. (Brown & Korff, 2012) Moreover require vendors to track
whether the system ends up where it was sold.
(4) Further inspiration in existing US bills (Smith, 2012)
To specify (1): remote termination of censorship will only be carried out if US imposes an arms
export ban on the government as well, since that shows that a government is a threat to international
security. US can also demand (1) if systems gets re-sold to a different state to which there are export
bans; this effectively solves the intermediary issue.
4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In either scenario, there will be indirect costs to US – the industry is still implicitly weakened and
Saur-N is required to take on some additional costs. Nevertheless, since we cannot rule out of
possibility of WKAR buying censorship only for its business, banning it outright seems excessive as
many democratic nations use censorship. (Google, 2012) On the other extreme, trade without any
regulation is unacceptable as the political risks are too great.
US should allow this trade with restriction, as the cost-benefit ratio appears to be the best possible.
Restriction (1) should not bother WKAR, since it is a problem only if the government is severely
violating human rights. As for (2), there is already some precedent and hence this procedure is
standard. Therefore such proposal should remain acceptable to WKAR and is acceptable to the
US.

MEMORANDUM
Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge | KG10240 4
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